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Our paper investigates whether the valuation eect caused by a large risk premium and
a low risk-free rate can help to explain the enormous US current account and trade decit
observed in the past decade. To answer this question, we set up an endowment growth model
in which investors are endowed with heterogeneous trading technologies. In our model, the
average US investors load up more aggregate risk by investing in a risky asset abroad and
issuing a risk-free asset. Thanks to the large risk premium as well as the low risk-free rate,
the US can sustain a long-run trade decit even as a debtor country. Quantitatively, we nd
that the valuation eect caused solely by the high risk premium and the low risk-free rate
in our model, which is calibrated to match the external assets and liabilities of US economy,
can account for more than half of the observed trade decit and current account decit. Our
results suggest that the current US trade decit might not necessarily lead to net export
increases or dollar depreciation in the future.
Keywords: Global Imbalances; External Account; Risk Premium; Asset Pricing; Limited
Participation (JEL code: E21, F32, F41, G12)
We would like to thank Harold Cole, Jonathan Heathcote, Hanno Lustig and Vincenzo Quadrini for helpful
discussions and comments.
yDepartment of Economics, Purdue University, 403 West State St., West Lafayette, IN 47907; Email:
ychien@purdue.edu
zSame mailing address; Email: knaknoi@purdue.edu.1 Introduction
The debate on the sustainability of global imbalances originated in the persistent and large US
current account decit. The US current account decit rose from 4% of GDP in 2000 to 6% of
GDP in 2005 and 2006. Historically, 5% to 8% current-account-decit-to-GDP ratios in developing
countries were followed by a sudden stop of capital inows, a sharp currency depreciation and a
current account reversal (Calvo (1998) ; Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002)).1 A reversal of current
account decits and trade decits following persistent and large external imbalances is in fact
predicted by the intertemporal approach to the current account. Obstfeld and Rogo (2000) and
Obstfeld and Rogo (2007) have predicted that a reversal of the US current account decit is
inevitable and the future US trade surplus requires the dollar real exchange rate to depreciate by
as much as 50%.
However, Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) have pointed out that the current account statistics and
the intertemporal approach to the current account do not incorporate capital gains of external as-
sets or the so-called valuation eect. The gap between current account statistics and trade balance
statistics is equal to net factor income ows combined with unilateral transfers, which are quite
modest for most countries, including the US. For this reason, the debate on the sustainability of the
current account decit becomes the debate on the sustainability of the trade decit. Gourinchas
and Rey (2007b) propose a new measure of global imbalances to take into account the changes of
prices of US external assets and liabilities. They emphasize the short-run adjustment, and assume
that the long-run return on US external assets and liabilities is identical. As a result, their work
suggests that the estimated valuation eect results only from the short-run dollar depreciation,
which has the same eect across types of assets. A subsequent study by Gourinchas, Rey, and
Govillot (2010) conrms the large US long-run returns dierential with updated data and oers
a rare disaster model to account for the empirical nding. Quantitatively, the trade balance pre-
dicted by their model is -0.72% of output in normal time, 1.53% of output during diaster periods,
and overall -0.18% unconditionally. Clearly, their model did not generate a large long-run trade
decit.
In this study, we examine the quantitative impact of valuation eects, which are solely caused
1The current account decit in Mexico in 1994 and Thailand in 1996 prior to their balance of payments crises
was 8%. Argentina's current account decit in 1998, prior to the 1999-2001 nancial crisis, was 5%.
1by a large risk premium and a low risk-free rate, not by exchange rates. Our valuation eect
reects dierent degrees of riskiness of assets held by US residents and residents in the rest of
the world (ROW). The major distinction from Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2010) is the sus-
tainability of large trade decits generated by our calibrated model. We build a multi-country
general equilibrium model featuring heterogeneous portfolio choices across households. The world
is an endowment growth economy, in which a consumption good is homogeneous and freely traded
across borders with unit real exchange rate. The key feature is that households have heterogeneous
trading technologies, as in Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011). To be specic, a fraction of households
are Mertonian traders, who can trade state-contingent claims and hence frequently adjust their
portfolios in response to changes in the investment opportunity set. The remaining households are
non-Mertonian traders holding xed portfolios of equities and bonds. An additional feature is that
the fraction of each type of traders varies across each country. Therefore, the overall trading tech-
nologies of one country are dened by the composition of the traders' pool across the population.
Note that households in our model are completely rational subject to their trading technologies
and borrowing constraints. In other words, their consumption Euler equations are always satised.
Intuitively, heterogeneous trading technologies generate dierences in the portfolios held by
Mertonian traders and those held by passive traders. Households with more sophisticated trading
technologies take greater aggregate risk by holding a large fraction of equity in their portfolios,
while households with a less sophisticated trading technology take a more cautious approach.
Therefore, a large amount of risk could be concentrated in a relatively small group of traders
because of the limitation in trading technologies. Thanks to the compensation for risk holdings,
households with a large equity position ultimately earn a high rate of return on their portfolios,
accumulate a greater amount of wealth and enjoy a high level of consumption. On the other
hand, less sophisticated investors earn a low return on their portfolio, acquire a low level of wealth
and consume little. Hence, heterogeneous trading technologies induce consumption and wealth
dispersion. To understand the implication for international trade, consider aggregating all agents
in each country. If a country loads up more aggregate risk than the ROW, then this country earns
a higher average wealth return, consumes more than its output and runs a trade decit, even in
the long run. In our model, a higher degree of aggregate risk exposure of a country can result from:
(i) a higher rate of equity market participation; and (ii) a larger fraction of equity in the portfolios
2held by equity market participants. Therefore, external balances are signicantly associated with
trading technologies and the scale of the risk premium.
In addition, our idea illustrates that the essential factor that decides the sustainability of trade
decits is the excess risk held by a country. If a country bears more aggregate risk than the ROW,
its trade decit can co-exist with a negative net external asset position. For example, US investors
can load up risk while running a trade decit, by issuing risk-free bonds and investing in equities
abroad. In other words, there is no particular relationship between the net foreign asset position
and the trade balance in the long run. Hence, focusing on the external net asset position might
lead to a misleading conclusion regarding the adjustment of the trade decit. Most importantly,
an increase in the trade decit might not necessarily lead to an equal increase in net exports in
the future, and the magnitude of currency depreciation required to reduce the trade decit might
be small.
In the quantitative part, we calibrate the model to match the historically high equity premium as
well as the low and stable risk-free rate. By introduction of heterogeneity in trading technologies,
our calibrated model forces a small fraction of Mertonian traders to absorb a large amount of
aggregate risk. Therefore, our benchmark model generates a 6.35% equity premium and a 2.16%
risk-free return, which are quite close to the estimates in Guvenen (2009).2 Our calibration targets
of the risk premium and the risk-free rate are conservatively chosen. In fact, our results will be
enhanced if the model is calibrated to match a higher equity premium or a lower risk-free rate.
In addition, the heterogeneity in trading technologies also makes the model exible enough to
characterize the asymmetric composition of asset holdings across the world. More specically, by
changing the idiosyncratic risk and the composition of the traders' pool across countries, the model
could be calibrated to match the average debt-equity composition of the US external asset and
liability position from 2000 to 2009. The quantitative results of our calibrated model show a large
trade decit in the long run. The US trade decit is predicted to be 2.95% of output, which is more
than one half of the average US trade decit in 2000-2009. Our model predicts the average trade
decit in the long-run equilibrium, while the recent surge of US trade decit might still reect the
2In the asset pricing literature, the equity premium is generally considered at least higher than 6% and the
risk-free rate is lower than 2%. For examples, Guvenen (2009) shows that US equity premium is 6.17% and the
risk-free rate is 1.94%. Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011) nd that the equity premium is 7.53% and the risk-free rate
is 1.05%. According to Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the US equity premium and the US risk-free rate are 6.69%
and 0.1% respectively. In the Table 2 of Alvarez and Jermann (2001), the equity premium is 6.18% and the risk-free
rate is 0.8%.
3transition path. During the transition, the trade decit could be quite large since the US net asset
position is deteriorating.
Our main contribution to the literature is the quantitatively large impact of the risk premium
on global imbalances. Since the ocial current account statistics do not incorporate the valuation
eect, our results imply that one half of the US current account decit in the past decade is sus-
tainable. For this reason, the risk premium, which has strong support in empirical studies, should
be considered an important part of the valuation eect. The second contribution of our work is
that our modeling approach provides a new theoretical framework to study various questions re-
lated to capital ows and the current account. Although the theoretical literature in open-economy
macroeconomics has extensively studied portfolio choices, the risk premium generated by the ex-
isting studies falls short of the estimates in the empirical literature. Since the household's saving
decision concerns not only the level of saving but also the composition of assets, incorporating
a large risk premium into an open-macro model is essential for understanding the dynamics of
current account. In this regard, our model is complementary to that of Mendoza, Quadrini, and
Ros-Rull (2009), who consider the returns dierential between a risky asset and a risk-free bond in
a model with asymmetry in the degree of nancial development. However, the absence of long-run
output growth and aggregate shocks in their model results in a much smaller risk premium than
ours.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literatures. The
rst part of Section 3 illustrates our idea in a single equation. The rest of Section 3 provides the
statistics of US external balances and decomposes US external positions. Section 4 describes the
environment, the trading technologies and our model. The quantitative results as well as sensitivity
analysis are listed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes our study.
2 Related Literatures
Our paper is motivated by an empirical literature that documents the large returns dierential
between US external assets and liabilities in the past few decades. The literature includes Obstfeld
and Rogo (2005), Meissner and Taylor (2006), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Gourinchas and
Rey (2007a) and Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2010). In general, these papers nd that the
4United States' external liabilities roughly pay 3% to 4% less than its external assets at annual rates
of return. We consider these empirical ndings as strong evidence suggesting that the US investors
have loaded up more aggregate risk in external assets than liabilities. In addition, Gourinchas and
Rey (2007a) document that the US nances risky investment abroad by issuing low-risk, short-run
liabilities to the ROW in the past two decades.
However, Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008) nd that the US external assets do not nec-
essarily yield higher returns than its liabilities, suggesting that the eect of returns dierentials
might be small. We consider that their results might not be suitable for our model for the follow-
ing reasons. First, Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008) only consider portfolio equity and debt
securities and exclude the following types of assets: FDI, assets reported by nonbanking concerns,
and assets reported by US banks and securities brokers. The omitted claims account for 60% of
US external assets, and the omitted liabilities account for 50% of US external liabilities. Second,
the data period is from 1994 to 2004, which is relatively too short to estimate long-run average
returns. These estimated returns could be sensitive to the choice of sample period. Finally, the
frequency of their data is monthly while our calibrated model operates at annual frequency. Many
empirical studies have shown that most investors do not change their asset position or portfolio
very often.3 The return estimation from high frequency data, therefore, might not be suitable for
studying the long-run behavior of the trade decit and the current account.
A number of very recent theoretical studies have demonstrated that dierences in the time-
varying composition of asset portfolios of US investors and those of foreign investors play a role
in international capital ows, such as Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ros-Rull (2009), Tille and van
Wincoop (2010), Hnatkovska (2010), Devereux and Sutherland (2010), Angeletos and Panousi
(2011) and Bacchetta and Benhima (2010). These papers are certainly related to this strand of
research. Furthermore, Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2010) and Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock,
and Wongswan (2011) provide evidence that US investors may be better than foreign investors
at choosing country composition in their portfolios. Their work can be regarded as evidence that
US investors are endowed with better trading technologies, which can be incorporated into our
model by increasing the fraction of US Mertonian traders. However, we take a cautious approach
3There is strong empirical evidence suggesting that households do not change their asset allocations often. For
example, these papers include Ameriks and Zeldes (2004), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), Calvet, Campbell, and
Sodini (2009) and Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2011)
5in our benchmark economy by assuming identical fractions of Mertonian traders in both countries.
Alternatively, we consider the asymmetric fraction of Mertonian traders in subsection 5.5. The
results show that the higher fraction of US Mertonian traders is, the higher is the trade decit.
We make the following contributions to the literature. First, we illustrate that even when
exchange rates do not adjust, the valuation eect can be quite large. We consider all the returns
dierentials between external assets and liabilities by allowing investors in dierent locations to
load a dierent amount of risk. The dierent amount of risk comes from both equity-bond returns
dierentials and the composition of external assets and external liabilities. The large dierential
between equity-bond returns and composition of assets oers an explanation for the estimated
returns dierentials between external assets and external liabilities in Gourinchas and Rey (2007a)
and Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2010). However, the returns dierentials are absent in the
model of Gourinchas and Rey (2007b). For this reason, their estimated valuation eect is limited
by zero trade balance in the long run. Our work is complementary to their work in the sense that
the compensation for risk in our model increases the valuation eect by relaxing the constraint
that the long-run trade balance must be zero.
Second, our theoretical approach is complementary to that of Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ros-Rull
(2009), who build a portfolio choice model to illustrate that cross-country dierences in nancial
development produce heterogeneity in the composition of portfolios. Their model shows that the
asymmetric exposure to idiosyncratic risk caused by distinct nancial development across countries
leads to an equilibrium in which the nancially developed country becomes a debtor while holding
a positive net external position of risky assets. The dierences between their work and ours are
both in the focus as well as in the quantitative prediction. Specically, their focus is the cause of
the negative net external asset position of the US, but our focus is the quantitative impact of the
US net external asset position on the trade balance and the current account. Hence, the scale of the
risk premium is central to our analysis. The assumption of asymmetric trading technologies helps
us match the large scale of the risk premium, while the risk premium in Mendoza, Quadrini, and
Ros-Rull (2009) is less than 0:7% in most cases considered. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008)
explain global imbalances and low interest rates by a story of heterogeneous nancial development.
Our paper adds the consideration of the risk premium and emphasizes the trade decit.
Finally, our work is also related to Engel and Rogers (2006), who argue that a slightly optimistic
6assumption of a higher US GDP growth rate relative to the ROW can justify the large current
account decit in US data. The idea is straightforward: If US present value of future income is
greater due to the expected high US growth rate, then it is optimal for US households to borrow
against the future, resulting in a trade decit. Interestingly, our growth economy demonstrates a
similar mechanism by endogenously producing an equilibrium risk-free rate that is lower than the
GDP growth rate. In our case, the US can sustain the long-run trade decit simply by issuing a
risk-free bond to the ROW, because the risk-free return net of output growth rate turns negative.
This observation also contributes to the sizable long-run US trade decit predicted by our calibrated
model.
3 US External Account
In this section, we decompose the US external asset position into the net external equity position
and the net external bond position. In short, we classify assets into two types, namely equity and
bonds. To highlight our idea and why such decomposition is central to our analysis, let us rst
discuss the inuence of asset returns on the net external asset position and the trade balance in
the long run.
3.1 Asset Returns, Net External Asset Position and Trade Balance
Consider the following dynamics of the net external asset position:
NFAt+1 = Rt+1NFAt + NXt+1; (1)
where NFAt is the net external asset position at the end of period t, Rt+1 is the gross return on
the net external assets from the end of period t to the end of period t + 1, and NXt+1 is the net
exports or the trade balance in the period t + 1. We then normalize the quantity variables by















7Consider the long-run stationary equilibrium in which NFAt+1=Yt+1 = NFAt=Yt and positive








Next, we assume realistically that the return on assets and that on liabilities could be dierent.
This assumption marks the major dierence between our model and that of Gourinchas and Rey
(2007b). We denote the returns by Ra
t+1 and Rl
t+1, respectively. Let FAt=Yt denotes the external
















where we assume FAt=Yt and FLt=Yt are invariant in a stationary equilibrium.
According to (2), we can predict the following patterns of the long-run net external asset
position and the long-run trade balance.
1. If Ra
t+1 = Rl
t+1 > g; then
NXt+1
Yt+1





Hence, in the absence of returns dierentials between external assets and external liabilities,
a negative net external asset position in the long-run must coexist with a positive trade
balance. In contrast, if Ra
t+1 = Rl
t+1 < g; then the trade surplus must result from negative
















In other words, a country can run a trade decit in the long-run when the net return (net of
output growth) on external assets is higher than the net return on external liabilities. The
above condition may hold even when NFAt=Yt = FAt=Yt   FLt=Yt < 0 and is particularly
true if Ra
t+1 > g > Rl
t+1.
Evidently, we cannot predict sign relationship between NFAt=Yt and NXt=Yt unless we take
8into account the valuation eect of Ra
t+1; Rl
t+1 and g. Of most importance, Ra
t+1 and Rl
t+1 depend
on the portfolio choice of external assets and liabilities. In particular, our emphasis is on the re-
turns dierentials coming from the dierent degrees of risk of each asset class and how such returns
dierentials are aected by the portfolio choice. To evaluate our idea, the ideal approach is to cal-
ibrate our model to match the portfolio distribution across world-wide population. Unfortunately,
the detailed portfolio data at the individual level are not available. At the aggregate level, the
investment position database usually consists of holding of several types of assets, namely foreign
direct investment (FDI), stock, bond and currency. However, we still face several challenges to
evaluate the actual degree of risk holding in the external liabilities and assets. First, the actual
composition of holding within each asset class may be quite dierent between external liabilities
and assets. It could be the case that US investors prefer value stocks while foreign investors hold
more growth stocks. In addition, the return on FDI is not identical to the stock return, and the
returns on various types of bonds vary a great deal, from treasury securities to junk bonds. Finally,
on the model side, we are not able to consider all types of assets available on the nancial markets
due to computational constraints.
To overcome these diculties, we proceed with a simple idea: by allowing investors to hold a
portfolio of a risky equity and a risk-free bond, we can replicate any desired risk structure observed
in the data. In other words, we can use these two assets to replicate the observed portfolio returns as
a simple way to account for dierent degrees of risk chosen by US investors and foreign investors. If
US external assets load up more risk than its external liabilities, then the average return of external
assets must exceed the average return on liabilities. In the following subsection, we describe how to
decompose the US external asset and liability position, respectively, into the external risky equity
and external risk-free bond in order to replicate the observed portfolio returns.
3.2 Decomposition of US External Position
We limit our attention to the US net asset position in 2000-2009, because the debate over the
sustainability of global imbalances is concerned with this period. We measure all variables relative
to US output, where output is dened as trade balance plus private consumption and government
consumption. Our measure of output is equivalent to GDP excluding investment, as in the model.
To decompose the US net external asset position into the net external equity position and the
9net external bond position, we proceed in the following three steps. First, we calculate the US
external asset and liability positions as a share of real output. See Appendix A for a detailed data
description.
Second, we calculate the share of equity in the external asset position (sUS) and the share
of equity in the external liability position (sROW) such that the average return on US external
assets and the average return on US external liabilities match the estimates in Gourinchas and
Rey (2007a). As discussed above, assets in the BEA's database are issued by a large number of
countries and they have dierent degrees of risk and returns, but equity and bonds in our calibrated
model are assumed to be homogeneous across countries. Hence, the equity premium are the same
across countries:
ExRD = ERD   ERf;
where ERD denotes the unconditional expected return on the equity, ERf denotes the uncondi-
tional expected return on the risk-free bond, and ExRD denotes the unconditional equity premium.
Then, the implied equity shares need to satisfy the followings equations for external assets and
liabilities, respectively:
sUSERD + (1   sUS)ERf = ER
a; (3)
sROWERD + (1   sROW)ERf = ER
l: (4)
As we shall show later, our calibrated benchmark model produces a 6:35% equity premium and a
2:15% risk-free return, thus the return on equity is 8:50%. In Gourinchas and Rey (2007a), the
average return on the US external assets and the average return on the US external liabilities in the
post-Bretton Woods period are 6:8% and 3:5%, respectively. As discussed in the introduction, the
returns dierential estimated by Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) is in line with several other empirical
studies, which nd that the returns dierential is between 3% and 4%. We substitute these returns
into (3) and (4) to obtain sUS and sROW. Hence, sUS = 0:73 and sROW = 0:21.
In the last step, we use the calculated sUS and sROW to derive the US net external equity
position and the US net external bond position as follows.










2. US net external bond position:
NBt
Yt
= (1   sUS)
FAt
Yt




Table I provides the average of the US external asset position, external liability position and
balance of payments relative to output in 2000-2009. During 2000-2009, the average of the US
external asset position is 107:11% of output. The average of the US external liability position is
133:46% of output. Substituting these statistics into (5) and (6) yields the net external equity
position and the net external bond position as 50:39% and  76:74% of output, respectively. Their
sum, which is the US net external asset position, is  26:35% of output. We report the balance
of payments in the last three rows in Table I. We exclude unilateral transfers from our measure
of the current account in order to capture only market transactions. On average, the US current
account decit in 2000-2009 is 4:88% of output. More than 100% of this sizable decit is trade
decit, which amounts to 5:52% of output. The net factor income account is in surplus of 0:64%
of output.
[Table 1 about here.]
4 The Model
This section oers a detailed description of the model.
4.1 Environment
Consider a multi-country world in which there are a large number of agents in each country. There is
one endowment good, which is also the consumption good. The endowment good is homogeneous
and freely traded across borders, hence the international relative price of the good, or the real
exchange rate, is always one. Time is discrete, innite and indexed by t 2 [0;1;2;:::). The initial
11period, t = 0, is a planning period in which nancial contracting takes place. There is aggregate
uncertainty in the world and we do not assume country-specic productivity shocks to simplify our
analysis. We use zt 2 Z to denote the aggregate shock in period t, and let zt denote the history of




where gt(zt) is the stochastic growth rate of the endowment and is equivalent to the growth rate
of world output. The share of each country in the world output is exogenously given and denoted
by i: Hence, output of country i is given by: Y i
t (zt) = iYt(zt), and
PI
i=1 i = 1. Output of
each country is divided into two parts, namely diversiable output and non-diversiable output.
The non-diversiable portion is subject to idiosyncratic stochastic shocks in addition to aggregate
shocks. Let i
t denote the idiosyncratic shock in period t of country i. Similarly, i;t denotes
the history of idiosyncratic shocks for the household i. The non-diversiable portion of output is
therefore given by: iY i
t (zt)i
t, where i denotes the share of non-diversiable output in output
of country i. The idiosyncratic events i
t are i.i.d. across households within country i. Its mean
is normalized to one. We use (zt;i;t) to denote the unconditional probability of state (zt;i;t)











4.2 Leverage and Assets Supply
There are three type of assets available in this economy: equity, bonds, and contingent claims on
aggregate shocks. All of these assets are claims to the diversiable output. Note that this is still
an incomplete market economy since there are no state-contingent assets on idiosyncratic shocks.
The international nancial market is assumed to be fully integrated.
We simply consider the equity of country i as a leveraged claim on its aggregate diversiable
output ((1   i)Y i
t (zt)). The leverage ratio is constant over time and denoted by . Let Bi
t(zt)
denote the supply of a one-period risk-free bond in period t in country i and W i
t(zt) denote the
price of a claim to country i0s aggregate diversiable output in period t. With a constant leverage
12ratio, the total supply of Bi















By the equation above, the aggregate diversiable output can be decomposed into the interest
payment to bond holders and payouts to shareholders, and the total payouts, Di




















t;t 1(zt 1) denotes the risk-free rate at period t   1. Note that Bi
t(zt) across each country
i is essentially identical, since it pays the same risk-free return, R
f
t+1;t(zt). For simplicity, our
model assumes a constant supply of shares. As a result, if a rm reissues or repurchases shares
of equity, it must be reected by Di
t(zt) in our model. Simply speaking, Di
t(zt) includes both the
cash dividends and net repurchases.
Traders who invest a fraction =(1+) of their wealth in bonds and the rest in equity hold the
market portfolio, which is identical to holding a claim to aggregate output. We denote the value of
the equity (a claim to payouts Di
t(zt)) by V i
t (zt). R
i;d
t;t 1(zt), the gross return of country i0s equity











As for the state-contingent claim, we denote the price of a unit claim to the nal good in aggregate
state zt+1 acquired in aggregate state zt by Qt(zt+1;zt):
4.3 Trading Technologies
A trading technology is dened as restrictions on portfolios in terms of the menu and composition
of assets that a household can implement in any given period. Our model assumes two types
of trading technologies, Mertonian trading technologies and non-Mertonian trading technologies.
Mertonian traders can trade state-contingent claims on aggregate shocks. Therefore, they can
optimally adjust their portfolio choice in response to the change of the investment opportunity set.
They face no restrictions on their portfolio choice except they cannot trade a claim contingent on
the idiosyncratic shocks. The menu of assets in non-Mertonian trading technologies consists only
13of equity and bonds, excluding all state-contingent claims. In addition, non-Mertonian traders are
assumed to have a xed equity target share in their portfolio and to rebalance their portfolio in
order to achieve the target equity share every period. There is a special type of non-Mertonian
traders, who hold zero equity target share. Since they do not participate in the equity market at
all, we call them non-participants. As for those whose trading strategy consists of a positive xed
equity target share, we refer to them as non-Mertonian equity traders.
Non-Mertonian trading technologies dier from the optimal strategy along two dimensions.
First, non-Mertonian traders cannot actively change the share of equity in their portfolio in response
to changes in the market price of risk. To put it simply, they miss the market timing. As a result,
they only choose the level of saving while their portfolio return is given by the xed trading strategy.
Secondly, we assume that the average equity share of non-Mertonian traders tends to be lower than
the optimal level. As a result, these non-Mertonian traders are less exposed to the aggregate risk
and hence earn a lower average return on their portfolio. In other words, they partly forgo the
risk premium. These two dierences in trading strategy create a sub-optimal consumption-savings
choice along with the distorted asset allocation. Therefore, the consumption variation caused by
the sub-optimal trading strategies is closely associated with the level of the risk premium as well
as the variation of the risk premium.
We denote the fraction of traders in terms of the value of their non-diversiable income or human
wealth in each country i by 
j
i; where j 2 fm;et;npg represents Mertonian traders, non-Mertonian
equity traders and non-participants, respectively.
4.4 Household's Problem
Preferences All households have identical preferences. A household in country i ranks the


















where  denotes the coecient of relative risk aversion,  is the time discount factor and ci
t(zt;i;t)
denotes the household's consumption in state (zt;i;t): All households are ex-ante identical except
in their trading technologies, which are reected in their budget constraints.
14Budget Constraint of Mertonian Traders Consider a Mertonian trader in country i entering




t (zt;i;t 1), where a
i;j
t (zt;i;t 1) denotes the total assets
from country j held by households in country i in period t given the history (zt;i;t 1). Note that
the net nancial wealth is not spanned by the realization of idiosyncratic shocks, i
t; since there
are no contingent claims on idiosyncratic shocks. Otherwise, Mertonian traders face no restrictions
on asset trading. At the end of the period, this trader buys securities in nancial markets (state-
contingent claims b a
i;j
t (zt+1;i;t) issued by country j, risk-free bonds issued by country j; b
i;j
t (zt;i;t),
and equity shares of country j; s
i;j
t (zt;i;t)) and consumption ci
t(zt;i;t) in the goods markets subject













































t; for all z
t;
i;t; (8)
where Qt+1(zt+1;zt) denotes the price of a unit contingent claim to the nal good in aggregate





state (zt;i;t), is given by the payos of his state-contingent claim acquired last period, the payos














































t , is normalized to be 1.
Budget Constraint of Non-Mertonian Traders Households with non-Mertonian trading
technologies can only access equities and bonds. In addition, all non-Mertonian traders are assumed
to adopt a time-invariant portfolio choice, which is described by the equity share of each country
i in their portfolio. This equity share is denoted by ! = f!igI
i=1. Hence, we can denote their
4Notice that the price of a claim to aggregate output is independent of the country of issuance, since there are
























In order to reach a constant equity share, !; dened in their portfolio, they need to rebalance their
portfolio to hit the target equity share !i for each country at each period.




t (zt;i;t 1) in the beginning of period t. During the period, this household receives non-
diversiable income, iY i
t (zt)i
t and consumes ci
t(zt;i;t) in the goods markets. At the end of
period t; the household buys equity shares, s
i;j
t (zt;i;t) and risk-free bonds, b
i;j
t (zt;i;t) subject to












































In addition, the return on this xed-weight portfolio is dened as in (10). The ow budget con-






















i;t); for all z
t;
i;t: (12)
Finally, for the budget constraint of non-participants, set the equity share ! to zero vector. In




t (zt;i;t 1)  0. The
details of the household problem and its associated Euler equations are in Appendix B.
164.5 Aggregation
We start with the aggregate budget constraint of country i, which can be obtained by summing
the ow budget constraint (Equations (8) and (12)) across all types of households in country i.
The idiosyncratic risks across households oset each other by applying the law of large numbers









t(zt;i;t)(i;t). The aggregate budget constraint of country i






































t); for all z
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From the above aggregate budget constraint of country i, we can derive the dynamic equation of















where Rt+1(zt+1) is the gross return on external assets. Equation (14) is a stochastic version of
Equation (1).
4.6 Asset Pricing and External Accounts
Next, we explain the implications of our model for asset pricing as well as the external account.
Asset Pricing In our model, there are two key frictions to match the low risk-free rate and the
high risk premium observed in the data. The rst friction is the incomplete market with respect to
idiosyncratic risk. It is well known that incomplete market models can produce reasonable risk-free
rate implications in a growing economy. The second friction, limited participation, combined with
17non-Mertonian trading technologies of some market participants, produces a high equity premium
by concentrating the aggregate risk among Mertonian traders. This is in line with Chien, Cole,
and Lustig (2011), but they only consider a closed economy. Our paper extends the model into
a multi-country economy and studies the determination as well as the consequences of global
imbalances.
External Accounts In addition, the asymmetric trading technologies across countries with re-
spect to the market participation rate and the composition of trader pools generate heterogeneous
portfolio holdings across countries. A country with better trading technologies can take more ag-
gregate risk by holding a larger fraction of equity while others take a more cautious approach by
holding a greater fraction of risk-free assets. We also consider asymmetric idiosyncratic risks across
countries. Households who face greater idiosyncratic risks accumulate more wealth according to
precautionary saving motivation, implying a country with higher idiosyncratic risks tends to run
a positive net asset position. This channel operates in the same way as Mendoza, Quadrini, and
Ros-Rull (2009).
4.7 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is dened in a standard way. It consists of a list of bond,
equity, and state-contingent claims holdings; a consumption allocation; and a list of bond, equity,
and state-contingent prices such that: (i) given these prices, a trader's asset and consumption
choices maximize her expected utility subject to the budget constraints, the solvency constraints,
and the constraints on trading technologies, and (ii) all asset markets clear.
5 Quantitative Results
This section starts with the discussion of model calibration. In the following subsections, we
evaluate our calibrated model to examine the extent to which our model can account for the US
external balances, especially with respect to the trade balance. We achieve this goal by three steps.
To illustrate the intuition of our model, we rst consider a symmetric two-country model, in which
both countries have identical trading technologies and an identical idiosyncratic shock process.
18Then, we consider a benchmark model, which is calibrated to match several key features of asset
compositions in US external accounts. In the Subsection 5.4, we demonstrate the importance of the
risk premium to our results by considering a model without the aggregate risk, in which the equity
premium is zero by construction. The last subsection displays the results of sensitivity analyses on
the change in the composition of Mertonian traders and non-participants.
5.1 Calibration
We consider a two-country version of our model. Country 1, or the home country, is the United
States (US) and Country 2, or the foreign country, is the ROW. The size of each country is
measured by its share in world GDP. Table II displays country size together with other parameter
values used in all cases.
The US share of world GDP is 33%, although the actual US GDP share from the US Department
of Agriculture's ERS Database in 1980-2009 is 27% on average. The reason is that our hypothetical
world does not comprise all countries. To be precise, our hypothetical world consists of 48 countries,
which are OECD countries, large developing countries such as China and India, and medium-size
developing countries. These 48 countries account for 83% of the actual world GDP in 1980-2009.
Thus, the US GDP share in our hypothetical world adjusts to 33%.
Our calibration strategy of aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks is based on Alvarez and
Jermann (2001). Aggregate shocks are calibrated into a two state rst order Markov Chain with
the rst aggregate state as a recession and the second aggregate state as an expansion. Since
there are only two aggregate states in our calibrated economy, the two assets, the equity and the
risk-free bond, are sucient to replicate any return of aggregate state-contingent claims. We drop
the redundant state-contingent assets in our calibrated model. The stochastic aggregate output
growth process is calibrated by four statistics: (i) the relative frequency between expansion and
recession; (ii) the average growth rate of consumption per capita; (iii) the standard deviation of
the growth rate of consumption per capita; and (iv) the rst order auto-correlation of the growth
rate of consumption per capita.
Expansions occur more often than recessions, the frequency of expansion is set to 27.4% as in
Alvarez and Jermann (2001). The aggregate shocks are assumed to be i.i.d, given the fact that
the growth rate of consumption is hard to predict. We also verify this assumption in our data
19by showing that the rst order auto-correlation of the growth rate of real consumption per capita
is not statistically dierent from zero for most countries. Specically, we obtain the rst order
auto-correlation of country-specic growth rates of real consumption per capita by regressing the
growth rates of real consumption per capita on its one-period lag and a constant. We nd that
the coecient of the lag term is statistically not dierent from zero at 1% signicance level for 42
out of 48 countries.
The average output growth rate and its standard deviation are 2.54% and 3.02% in our data









and the average growth rate of output in the recession state and the expansion state is as follows:
zL = 0:9762;zH = 1:0440.
We also consider a two state rst order Markov Chain for idiosyncratic shocks. The rst
state is low and the second state is high. Following Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007), we calibrate this shock process by two moments, namely
the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks and the rst order auto-correlation of the shocks
respectively, except we eliminate the counter-cyclical variation in idiosyncratic risk. The Markov
process for the log of non-diversied income share, log; has a standard deviation of 0:71; and its








The two states of idiosyncratic shocks, the mean of which is normalized to 1, are L = 0:3894; and
H = 1:6106.
Note that we do not have good sources for the idiosyncratic shock process for the ROW. As
we shall show later, we calibrate the idiosyncratic shock process for the ROW to approximate the
composition of the US external asset and liability position. Our calibration in fact indicates that
the volatility of the ROW idiosyncratic process is slightly larger than that of the US, which is
consistent with the nding of Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ros-Rull (2009).
20All households in the world have the same CRRA preference. Since this is a growth economy
with 2:54% average growth rate, we set the time discount factor  = 1, given the annual calibration
of our model. The risk aversion rate  is set to be 6 in order to produce a high risk premium in
our benchmark calibration. Following Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011), the fraction of diversiable
output is set to be 10%, which is also close to 11:25% set by Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ros-Rull
(2009).5 As shown in Section 4, equity in our model is simply a leveraged claim to diversiable
income. In the Flow of Funds, the ratio of corporate debt to net worth is roughly 0.65, suggesting
a leverage parameter of 2. Nevertheless, the study by Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990) reports
that the standard deviation of the growth rate of dividends is at least 3.6 times that of aggregate
consumption, suggesting that the appropriate leverage level is over 3. Following Abel (1999),
Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011), the leverage ratio parameter is set
to be 3 in the US. For simplicity, leverage ratios are assumed to be the same across countries,
implying equities of all countries are identical.
[Table 2 about here.]
5.2 Symmetric Cases
To illustrate the mechanism of our model, we start with a symmetric version, in which the composi-
tion of traders and the idiosyncratic shock process are identical in the home country and the foreign
country. In this symmetric version of the model, we consider three quantitative experiments, which
are dierent according to the traders' pool.
1. Experiments 1: The pool of traders consists of 100% Mertonian traders in both countries.
2. Experiments 2: The pool of traders consists of 5% Mertonian traders and 95% non-Mertonian
equity traders in both countries. The equity target share of non-Mertonian traders, !, is
assumed to be 25%. Hence, the non-Mertonian equity traders hold the market.
3. Experiments 3: The pool of traders consists of 5% Mertonian traders, 25% non-Mertonian
traders and 70% of non-participants in both countries. The non-Mertonian equity traders
are assumed to hold the market portfolio (! = 25%).
5Our result is robust to the variation in fraction of diversiable output.
21Symmetric Cases: Quantitative Results The rst panel of Table III reports the asset pricing
results of all experiments. We report the equity premium E(RD   Rf); the standard deviation
of excess return (RD   Rf); the Sharpe ratio on equity, the average risk-free rate E(Rf) and
the standard deviation of the risk-free rate (Rf). The second panel reports the wealth return
and the portfolio choice of each type of traders. Specically, it reports the following: the average
excess wealth return for Mertonian equity traders and non-Mertonian equity traders, denoted by
E(RW Rf)M and E(RW Rf)ET, respectively; the average equity share of portfolios for Mertonian
traders and non-Mertonian equity traders, E(!)M and E(!)ET respectively; and the same statistics
at the country level. E(RW  Rf)US and E(RW  Rf)ROW denote the average total wealth return
in the US and the ROW. Similarly, E(!)US and E(!)ROW stand for the average equity share of
the US and the ROW.
The last panel reports the US external balances statistics in percentage of US output. It is
important to note that the current account in our model is dierent from the ocial current account
statistics. To be precise, our theoretical current account include capital gains or capital losses as
well as payments of dividends and interest earnings, but the ocial current account statistics
include only payments of dividends and interest earnings. To illustrate the quantitative impacts
of capital gains or the valuation eect on the current account, we compute the ocial version of
the current account, denoted by CAo, by adding net dividend payments and net interest income
payments to the trade balance. In order to compute the net factor income account (NFIA), a
dividend process is necessary. For this model economy, the dividend process is assumed as a
version of leveraged aggregate consumption, with dividend growth determined by the following
equation
lnDiv   E(lnDiv) = [lnC   E(lnC)]:
Following Abel (1999), the leverage parameter  is assumed to be 3. We report the following
statistics in the last panel: the average trade balance, E(TB
Y )US, the average current account,
E(CA
Y ), the average ocial current account, E(CAo
Y ), the average NFIA, E(NFIA
Y ), the average net
external equity position, E(
NetEquity
Y )US, the average net external bond position, E(NetBond
Y )US,
and the net asset position, E(NetAsset
Y )US. All of them are reported as percentage of output.
In the rst experiment, Mertonian traders have to hold the market portfolio in order to clear
the asset market given that all households are endowed with identical trading technologies. The
22equilibrium prices must adjust such that holding the market portfolio is the optimal portfolio choice.
This experiment is similar to the one by Krusell and Smith (1998) except that ours is an endowment
economy. Since all households face idiosyncratic risk, the precautionary saving motive leads to a
low risk-free rate of 3:26%, as reported in Table III.6 The risk-free rate is constant due to the
non-predictable consumption growth rate. In addition, the risk premium is only 2:38%, reecting
the equity premium puzzle shown by Mehra and Prescott (1985). To summarize, with identical
trading technologies across the population, the asset pricing result of our economy coincides with
that of standard macroeconomic models.
In the second experiment, we replace 95% of traders with non-Mertonian equity traders, who
are assumed to hold the market portfolio. The second column of Table III reports the results. This
result suggests that the equilibrium allocations and prices of the second experiment are identical
to those of the rst experiment. The intuition is straightforward. Given the equilibrium prices
of Experiment 1, the portfolio choice of non-Mertonian equity traders is an optimal one (market
portfolio) and Mertonian traders behave exactly the same as in the Experiment 1. No agents
change their decision rules regarding consumption and investment. Consequently, the equilibrium
allocations and prices are unchanged. In fact, this result is proven analytically by Krueger and
Lustig (2010). From this experiment, we learn that even though Mertonian traders have superior
trading technologies, they take no advantage if other traders do not make investment mistakes. As
a result, there is no dierence between Mertonian and non-Mertonian equity traders. However, this
will not be the case if we replace a fraction of non-Mertonian equity traders with non-participants,
who deviate from the optimal portfolio choice. We demonstrate this in the third experiment.
Finally, in the third experiment, we decrease the fraction of non-Mertonian equity traders to
25% and add 70% of non-participants, while keeping 5% of Mertonian traders. The third column
of Table III reports the results. The risk-free rate becomes even lower, 2:13%, and still remains
almost constant with only 0:11% standard deviation. At the same time, the equity premium
increases to 6:69%, which is close to that in the data. The second panel shows that Mertonian
traders realize a much higher wealth return, 5:33%, by taking a large fraction of equity in their
portfolio, 79%. The intuitions for these results can be understood as follows. First, the portfolio
choice of non-participants clearly cannot be optimal given the prices of the previous experiments.
6The risk-free rate in the version of representative agent economy under our calibration is 13:97%, because of
2:54% of the average output growth and the low intertemporal rate of substitution, 1=.
23Their investment choice deviates from the market portfolio by holding no equity and hence they
do not bear any aggregate risk. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, replacing 70% of population
from non-Mertonian equity traders to non-participants creates some residual aggregate risk. The
residual risk has to be taken by other traders in equilibrium. Non-Mertonian equity traders are
still assumed to hold the market portfolio and hence they are unable to absorb any extra risk.
Eventually, all residual risk created by the non-participants has to be taken by Mertonian traders.
There is a large amount of residual risk due to the high fraction of non-participants. Hence, the
risk premium must be high in order to make a small fraction of Mertonian traders willing to take a
large amount of extra risk. Eventually, Mertonian traders earn a higher average return by taking
more aggregate risk and enjoy a higher level of consumption, while non-participants only earn the
low risk-free return and consume less.
The last 4 rows of Panel 2 report that the wealth return and portfolio choice are identical in
both countries in all experiments. In addition, the last panel reports that the US trade balance,
current account, ocial current account, NFIA and net asset position are all zero. These zero
balances clearly result from the symmetric assumption of these experiments. Most importantly,
these results suggest that each country holds the market portfolio, therefore both countries bear
an amount of aggregate risk exactly proportional to their country size. Since both bonds and
equity are identical across countries, without loss of generality, each country holds its own assets,
consumes its own endowments and carries no international trade. Hence, all external balances
become zero in all experiments. However, the results of balanced external accounts are no longer
true if we assume asymmetry across countries in trading technologies and in the idiosyncratic
process. In the next section, our benchmark economy considers the asymmetric case.
[Table 3 about here.]
5.3 Benchmark Case
Now consider the benchmark case, in which the composition of the traders pool as well as the
idiosyncratic shock process in the US are dierent from those in the ROW.
Benchmark Calibration In order to match a high equity premium, more than 6% as measured
in the post-war US data, a small fraction of Mertonian traders must absorb a large amount of
24residual risk. We therefore set the fraction of Mertonian traders to 5% for both countries. Our
benchmark case does not consider the environment in which any country has a larger fraction of
Mertonian traders than others. Having a larger fraction of Mertonian traders implies that the
overall trading technology in one country is superior to others. However, in the sensitivity analysis
in Subsection 5.5, we perform a case in which the US has a larger fraction of Mertonian traders to
illustrate that our mechanism is enhanced.
Since 51% of US households do not hold stocks according to the latest Survey of Consumer
Finance data, we set 50% of US investors as non-participants. We assume that the ROW on average
is nancially less developed than the US and hence its fraction of non-participants is higher than
that of the US. In particular, we set the fraction of non-participants in the ROW to 70%, which
is roughly the share of US non-participants in 1985, to reect that the US leads other countries in
terms of nancial development. In addition, the high fraction of non-participants helps us match
the low risk-free rate in the data. The remaining investors are non-Mertonian equity traders, and
their fractions are 45% and 25% in the US and the ROW, respectively.
In our model, equity and bonds are homogeneous across countries, so our model cannot pin down
the gross level of external equity and bonds of a country. We can only predict the net positions. The
equity target share of non-Mertonian equity traders in the home and foreign country, together with
the ROW idiosyncratic process are calibrated to match the US net foreign equity and net foreign
bonds positions implied by the data. As discussed in Section 3, the external balances statistics
are reported in the last panel in Table I. The net equity position and bond position implied by
the data are 50:39% and  76:74%, respectively. As a result, the equity target of the US and that
of the ROW are set to 35:3% and 25%. In addition, a slightly riskier idiosyncratic process of the
ROW helps us match the large negative net bond position. The transition probability of the ROW
idiosyncratic process remains unchanged, while the level of two states are set to L = 0:3510; and
H = 1:6490.
Quantitative Results of Benchmark Case Similar to the symmetric economy in the previous
subsection, we report the statistics of asset pricing, portfolio returns and US external balances.
The benchmark asset pricing results are in the rst panel of Table IV. Our benchmark economy
produces a high equity premium as well as a low and stable risk-free rate. The equity premium is
6:35% and the Sharpe ratio on equity is 49%. The average risk-free rate is 2:16% and its volatility
25is only 0:1%. Hence, our calibrated model is capable of producing reasonable asset pricing results.
Note that the return on bonds is less than the growth rate of output, meaning that a country can
in fact run a long-run trade decit by selling the risk-free bond abroad.
The second panel reports the wealth returns and the portfolio choices across traders and across
countries. The US Mertonian traders earn an average excess return of 5:19% by holding around
81% of equity in their portfolio. Because of higher idiosyncratic risks faced by foreign investors, the
ROW Mertonian traders take a slightly cautious approach. Their equity share is roughly 78% and
the average excess return on wealth drops to 5:02%. The US non-Mertonian equity traders realize
a higher excess wealth return, 2:25%, compared to the ROW non-Mertonian equity traders earning
1:59%, because of the dierence in equity target share, 35:3% and 25%, respectively. Given that the
US not only has a larger fraction of equity investors but also a higher equity target share among
these investors, in aggregate, US investors have 31:21% equity share in their overall portfolio,
which is higher than 21:95% among foreign investors. These equity shares include both foreign
equity and domestic equity, therefore we cannot compare them to the observed equity share in US
external assets and liabilities. Since the market portfolio is 25% equity and 75% bond, on average
the portfolio of US investors is riskier than that of average foreign investors. As a result, the US
investors are compensated by the higher overall portfolio excess return, 1:99%, compared to 1:40%,
the overall average return of foreign investors.
The external account statistics are reported in the last panel in Table IV. The model produces
50:38% of the US net-external-equity-output ratio and  76:16% of output in the external bond
position. These statistics closely match our data in Section 3. Most importantly, the long-run
average US trade balance is  2:95% of output, suggesting the valuation eect through asset returns
alone accounts for more than 50% of trade decit in the data,  5:52% of GDP. We also report the
average trade decit conditional on the aggregate state. The trade decit reduces to -2.46% during
recessions and advances to -3.13% in expansions. The behavior of the trade decit is consistent
with the recent reduction of the US trade decit after the 2007 nancial crisis. As explained in
Section 3, the large trade decit is caused by not only the high equity premium but also the low
risk-free rate, since holding the risk-free rate is lower than the growth rate of output. In the long
run, the theoretical current account becomes zero, otherwise there is no stationary equilibrium.
However, the ocial US current account, which only considers the interest and dividend payments,
26is  2:34% and the NFIA is 0:61% of output. These statistics are very close to the US data, 0:64%.
Clearly, ignoring capital gains creates a downward bias in the current account statistics. Finally,
the US current account rises in the good state and drops in the bad state, because US traders
take excess risk. The volatility of the current account is large. The conditional average during
recessions and expansions are -13.22% and 5.01% of output, respectively.
The main message of our exercise is that the net foreign asset position has no certain sign
relationship with the long-run trade balance. In our model, the allocation of aggregate risk is the
key determinant of the sustainability of the trade decit. The country bearing more aggregate risk
can enjoy the long-run trade decit nanced by the risk premium. As a result, the US can run a
large net liability position while enjoying the trade decit in the long run, while the ROW runs the
trade surplus. In addition, our model only computes the long-run equilibrium trade decit. If we
take the increasingly worsening US external account in the past decade into consideration, then the
current US trade decit might not pose a problem at all. Consider a very simple exercise. Suppose
we spread the current net external asset position, -26.35% of GDP, into into a ten year spell,
suggesting that the US consumes 2.63% of GDP more in each year. Therefore, the current large
trade decit does not necessarily imply a future increase in net exports or a dollar depreciation as
predicted by the recent literature.
[Table 4 about here.]
5.4 The Importance of the Risk Premium
The US long-run trade decit in our model comes from the compensation for excess aggregate risk
borne by US investors. If the market price of risk is low, taking the excess risk could have a sig-
nicantly small impact on the trade balance and current account. We now explore the importance
of the risk premium on the trade balance in the following exercise.
Consider an economy without the aggregate risk. If there is no aggregate risk, then the return on
equity is identical to the return on bonds, implying zero equity premium. The asymmetric trading
technologies across countries do not matter anymore, since portfolio returns are independent of
portfolio choices between equity and bonds. In this environment, a country with a negative external
asset position in the long run must have a surplus in the trade balance unless the return on external
liabilities is lower than the output growth rate. The only factor that matters to external balances
27here is the level of saving in each country. In this case, the precautionary saving motivated by the
idiosyncratic risk plays an essential role in global imbalances. Table V clearly reects the discussion
above.
The rst panel of Table V conrms that there is no returns dierential between equity and
bonds, and thus the risk premium is zero. The risk-free rate is now 3:87%, which is still relatively
low but higher than the growth rate of output. The results reported in the rest of Table V can
be easily understood. Since the composition of equity and bonds in portfolios does not aect the
return anymore, the wealth return statistics are identical across households and countries regardless
of their trading technologies. Note that neither the portfolio choice of Mertonian traders nor the
portfolio choice for each country can be determined, because now equity and bonds are the same
asset. Finally, the last panel of Table V indicates that the US net foreign asset position is negative,
 79:21% of GDP, due to the asymmetric volatility of idiosyncratic risk between the two countries.
The foreign households have a stronger precautionary saving motive, because of a higher level of
uncertainty in their non-diversiable income process. They accumulate a higher level of risk-free
assets compared to that of US households. More importantly, a country with a negative asset
position tends to run a trade surplus in the long run, since there is no returns dierential across
asset categories. The US runs 1:03% of GDP of trade surplus in each period. As discussed in
Section 3, a negative net asset position leads to a trade surplus in this case.
To summarize, the aggregate uncertainty as well as the level of risk premium are crucial to our
results. Without the aggregate risk, the heterogeneity in trading technologies does not matter and
global imbalances are driven only by the heterogeneity of idiosyncratic shocks.
[Table 5 about here.]
5.5 Sensitivity Analyses
We can use our model as a laboratory to examine the impact of nancial deepening with respect
to changing the fraction of traders in each country. We consider two cases. One varies the fraction
of Mertonian traders and the other considers the increasing trend of stock market participation in
the ROW.
28Fraction of Mertonian Traders Mertonian traders are equipped with the best trading tech-
nologies. They respond to the change in investment opportunities each period by optimally adjust-
ing their portfolios and make no investment mistakes. Increasing the fraction of Mertonian traders
of a country indicates an overall progress in trading technologies.
Table VI varies the fraction of Mertonian traders in the US and/or the ROW. The rst column
reports the benchmark case. The second column shows the results when we increase the fraction
of US Mertonian traders to 10%, the third column considers the case of 10% Mertonian traders in
the ROW, and nally, the last column reports the case of 10% Mertonian trader in both the US
and the ROW.
The rst panel of Table VI reports the lower risk premium as we increase the fraction of Merto-
nian traders. Given that Mertonian traders take residual risk, a larger fraction of Mertonian traders
reduces the equity premium, since the aggregate risk is spread out over the larger population. The
risk-free rate is slightly higher and its volatility remains almost unchanged.
As reported by the second panel of Table VI, the optimal equity share of Mertonian traders
drops in all three cases because of the lower equity premium. Similar to our benchmark case, the
US Mertonian traders earn a slightly higher wealth return and take more risks compared to that
in the ROW, because of asymmetric idiosyncratic risks. Although the equity premium is lower
compared to our benchmark case, the optimal portfolio still has a signicantly higher fraction of
equity than that of market portfolio. So the equity share of the portfolio of a country is positively
correlated with the fraction of Mertonian traders. In the rst case, the equity share of the US
increases to 35:49% while the equity share of ROW drops to 19:26%, simply because of the higher
fraction of Mertonian traders. On the other hand, the second case reports the increase of equity
share in the ROW to 23:88% and the decrease of equity share in the US to 24:62%. Finally, the
equity shares are relatively unchanged in the third case because of the equal percentage increment
of Mertonian traders.
The last panel of Table VI demonstrates the eects on the US external account. The trade
balance responds to the change of trading technologies signicantly. A 5% increase in Mertonian
traders pushes the net equity position into a positive number and increases the US trade decit to
5:87% of US output, which is a 99% increase from the benchmark. The is because the additional
Mertonian traders hold mostly equity in their portfolio. On the other hand, if the change occurs in
29the ROW as shown in the third column, the US trade balance improves to almost zero,  0:09% of
GDP. There is another key point worth being mentioned in the second case. Both the net external
equity position and the net external bond position in the US are negative, while the trade balance
is still slightly negative, meaning that the US still consumes more than its output. How is this
possible? The reason is that, the return on bonds is lower than the average growth rate of output.
Therefore, it is still possible that the US runs a trade decit despite holding negative balances in
all asset classes. Finally, the equal increment of Mertonian traders has a small impact on the trade
balance. The US trade balance changes to  2:21% compared to  2:95% of GDP in the benchmark
calibration. In sum, the trade balance critically depends on the overall trading technologies of a
country, especially the fraction of Mertonian traders.
[Table 6 about here.]
Fraction of Non-participant Traders This subsection studies the impact of increasing stock
market participation among non-Mertonian traders in the ROW. Table VII deviates the fraction
of non-participants from our benchmark case to 60% and 50%. In addition to the benchmark
result listed in the rst column, the second column reports the results of increasing the fraction of
non-Mertonian equity traders to 35% and decreasing non-participants to 60%: The third column
further changes the fraction of non-Mertonian equity traders and non-participants to 45% and 50%
respectively, while we keep other parameters unchanged.
The rst panel of Table VII shows that, as we decrease the fraction of non-participants from
70% to 50%, the equity premium as well as the Sharpe ratio decreases, while the risk-free rate goes
up. Fewer non-participants imply less residual risk and hence the aggregate risk has been spread
out over a larger pool of equity market participants. The equity premium drops slightly from
6:35% to 5:95% as the fraction of non-participants abroad changes from 70% to 50%. Increasing
the market participants aects the overall portfolio choice in the ROW as follows. The equity
share increases from 21:95% in the benchmark case to 23:35% in the last case. This suggests that
increasing market participants in the ROW shifts the load of risk from the US to the ROW.
The last panel indicates that unloading the aggregate risk of US investors impacts both the
trade balance and the net asset position. The US trade decit reduces from 2:95% of GDP in our
benchmark, to 2:00% of GDP with 10% more market participants in the ROW and down to 1:13%
30of GDP as the fraction of traders becomes equalized across countries.7 The US net asset position
deteriorates from the benchmark case,  25:79% to  52:83% in the case with 50% non-participants
in the ROW.
[Table 7 about here.]
6 Conclusion
Our paper makes both qualitative and quantitative contributions to the literature on global im-
balances. In terms of quantitative results, our calibrated model accounts for more than 50% of
both the US current account decit and the US trade decit in the past decade, or roughly 3%
of GDP. The magnitude of the trade decit in our model could be even larger by considering the
deteriorating US net asset position during the past two decades. Consequently, the large scale of
the US current account decit might not necessarily lead to net export increases or a large dollar
depreciation in the future.
The qualitative prediction that the US can sustain the long-run trade decit, or the current
account decit (excluding capital gains or losses as in the ocial statistics), builds on two simple
conditions: (i) positive risk premium; and (ii) average US investors take a relatively larger amount
of aggregate risk than average foreign investors. Therefore, we expect that any model producing
these two conditions can deliver the same qualitative results. In addition, these two conditions
have been supported by a large body of empirical literature. Empirical studies have shown that US
investors keep loading up more risks by issuing short-term debts and investing in foreign equities.
The large equity premium, as well as the low and stable risk-free rate observed in the data have
been a long-standing phenomenon that many studies aim to explain.
Nevertheless, we do not claim that asymmetric trading technologies are the only cause of the
large returns dierential between US external assets and US external liabilities. For instance, it
is possible that foreign equities are dierent from domestic equities because of country-specic
undiversiable risks, but we do not consider this case to emphasize the importance of composition
of assets. Another possible reason is provided by McGrattan and Prescott (2010), who oer
intangible capital as an explanation of returns dierentials in FDI.
7Note that the equity target share of the US and the ROW are still dierent, 35:3% and 25% respectively.
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35Table I: Average of US External Balances Relative to Output, 2000-2009 (%)
Description Average
A. International Investment Position
External asset position/output 107.11
External liability position/output 133.46
Net external asset position/output -26.35
Net external equity position/output 50.39
Net external bond position/output -76.74
B. Balance of Payments
Current account/output -4.88
Trade balance/output -5.52
Net factor income account/output 0.64
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
Notes: Net external equity position/output and net external bond position/output are Authors' calculation to replicate the average
portfolio returns in Gourinchas and Rey (2007a).
36Table II: Common Parameter Values for All Cases
Parameter Description Value
A. Structural Parameter
US US share of world GDP 0.33
ROW ROW share of world GDP 0.67
 Annual discount factor 1.00
 Degree of risk aversion 6.00
i;i = US;ROW Leverage ratio 3.00
i;i = US;ROW Share of non-diversiable output 0.90







zL Consumption growth in a recession 0.9762
zH Consumption growth in an expansion 1.0440
(zt) Standard deviation of consumption growth 0.0302
(zt;zt 1) 1st order auto-correlation of consumption growth 0







L Labor income shock in a recession 0.3894
H Labor income shock in an expansion 1.6106
(t) Standard deviation of labor income 0.71
(t;t 1) 1st order auto-correlation of labor income 0.89
37Table III: Three Experiments in Symmetric Case
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Mertonian 100% 5% 5%
Non-Mertonian Equity 0% 95% 25%
Non-Participant 0% 0% 70%
Panel I: Asset Pricing Result (%)
E(RD   Rf) 2:38 2:38 6:69
(RD   Rf) 12:27 12:27 13:24
E(RD Rf)
(RD Rf) 19:41 19:41 50:52
E(Rf) 3:26 3:26 2:13
(Rf) 0:00 0:00 0:11
Panel II: Portfolio and Return (%)
E(RW   Rf)M 0:60 0:60 5:33
E(RW   Rf)ET NA 0:60 1:67
E(RW   Rf)US 0:60 0:60 1:67
E(RW   Rf)ROW 0:60 0:60 1:67
E(!)M 25:00 25:00 79:07
E(!)ET NA 25:00 25:00
E(!)US 25:00 25:00 25:00
E(!)ROW 25:00 25:00 25:00
Panel III: External Balance (%)
E( TB
Y )US 0 0 0
E( CA
Y )US 0 0 0
E( CAo
Y )US 0 0 0
E( NFIA
Y )US 0 0 0
E(
NetEquity
Y )US 0 0 0
E( NetBond
Y )US 0 0 0
E( NetAsset
Y )US 0 0 0
Notes: Parameters setting:  = 6;  = 1; diversied share of income is 0:1. The simulation results are generated by an economy with
18;000 agents and 10;000 periods.
38Table IV: The Results of Benchmark Calibration
Share of Traders (%)
Benchmark
US Mertonian 5:00
US Non-Mertonian Equity 45:00
US Non-Participant 50:00
ROW Mertonian 5:00
ROW Non-Mertonian Equity 25:00
ROW Non-Participant 70:00
Panel I: Asset Pricing Result (%)
E(RD   Rf) 6:35





Panel II: Portfolio and Return (%)
E(RW   Rf)M;US 5:19
E(RW   Rf)M;ROW 5:02
E(RW   Rf)ET;US 2:25
E(RW   Rf)ET;ROW 1:59
E(RW   Rf)US 1:99











Y jz = R)US  2:46
E( TB




Y jz = R)US  13:22
E( CA












Notes: The simulation results are generated by an economy with 18;000 agents for each type and 10;000 periods.
39Table V: The Results without Aggregate Shocks
Share of Traders (%)
US Mertonian 5:00
US Non-Mertonian Equity 45:00
US Non-Participant 50:00
ROW Mertonian 5:00
ROW Non-Mertonian Equity 25:00
ROW Non-Participant 70:00
Panel I: Asset Pricing Result (%)
E(RD   Rf) 0





Panel II: Portfolio and Return (%)
E(RW   Rf)M;US 0
E(RW   Rf)M;ROW 0
E(RW   Rf)ET;US 0
E(RW   Rf)ET;ROW 0
E(RW   Rf)US 0
E(RW   Rf)ROW 0
E(!)ET;US 35:30
E(!)ET;ROW 25:00







Notes: The simulation results are generated by an economy with 18;000 agents for each type and 10;000 periods.
40Table VI: Eects of Size of Mertonian Traders
Share of Traders (%)
Benchmark Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
US Mertonian 5:00 10:00 5:00 10:00
US Non-Mertonian Equity 45:00 40:00 45:00 40:00
US Non-Participant 50:00 50:00 50:00 50:00
ROW Mertonian 5:00 5:00 10:00 10:00
ROW Non-Mertonian Equity 25:00 25:00 20:00 20:00
ROW Non-Participant 70:00 70:00 70:00 70:00
Panel I: Asset Pricing Result (%)
E(RD   Rf) 6:35 6:04 5:69 5:47
(RD   Rf) 12:99 12:91 12:82 12:76
E(RD Rf)
(RD Rf) 48:93 46:79 44:42 42:87
E(Rf) 2:16 2:24 2:32 2:38
(Rf) 0:10 0:09 0:08 0:08
Panel II: Portfolio and Return (%)
E(RW   Rf)M;US 5:19 4:87 4:48 4:21
E(RW   Rf)M;ROW 5:02 4:69 4:30 4:04
E(RW   Rf)ET;US 2:25 2:14 2:01 1:93
E(RW   Rf)ET;ROW 1:59 1:51 1:43 1:37
E(RW   Rf)US 1:99 2:15 1:55 1:70
E(RW   Rf)ROW 1:40 1:17 1:36 1:21
E(!)M;US 80:78 79:76 77:95 76:31
E(!)M;ROW 78:28 76:96 74:92 73:21
E(!)ET;US 35:30 35:30 35:30 35:30
E(!)ET;ROW 25:00 25:00 25:00 25:00
E(!)US 31:21 35:49 27:10 30:98
E(!)ROW 21:95 19:26 23:88 22:03
Panel III: External Balance (%)
E( TB
Y )US  2:95  5:87  0:09  2:21
E( CA
Y )US 0 0 0 0
E( CAo
Y )US  2:34  2:77  1:98  2:35
E( NFIA
Y )US 0:61 3:10  1:89  0:15
E(
NetEquity
Y )US 50:38 111:59  1:28 44:84
E( NetBond
Y )US  76:16  75:94  79:00  81:18
E( NetAsset
Y )US  25:79 35:65  80:28  36:34
Notes: The simulation results are generated by an economy with 18;000 agents for each type and 10;000 periods.
41Table VII: Eects of Equity Market Participation
Share of Traders (%)
Benchmark Case 1 Case 2
US Mertonian 5:00 5:00 5:00
US Non-Mertonian Equity 45:00 45:00 45:00
US Non-Participant 50:00 50:00 50:00
ROW Mertonian 5:00 5:00 5:00
ROW Non-Mertonian Equity 25:00 35:00 45:00
ROW Non-Participant 70:00 60:00 50:00
Panel I: Asset Pricing Result (%)
E(RD   Rf) 6:35 6:11 5:95
(RD   Rf) 12:99 12:79 12:75
E(RD Rf)
(RD Rf) 48:93 47:77 46:63
E(Rf) 2:16 2:22 2:26
(Rf) 0:10 0:09 0:09
Panel II: Portfolio and Return (%)
E(RW   Rf)M;US 5:19 4:97 4:83
E(RW   Rf)M;ROW 5:02 4:80 4:66
E(RW   Rf)ET;US 2:25 2:16 2:10
E(RW   Rf)ET;ROW 1:59 1:53 1:49
E(RW   Rf)US 1:99 1:83 1:72
E(RW   Rf)ROW 1:40 1:38 1:39
E(!)M;US 80:78 80:60 80:37
E(!)M;ROW 78:28 77:90 77:52
E(!)ET;US 35:30 35:30 35:30
E(!)ET;ROW 25:00 25:00 25:00
E(!)US 31:21 29:96 28:94
E(!)ROW 21:95 22:49 23:35
Panel III: External Balance (%)
E( TB
Y )US  2:95  2:00  1:13
E( CA
Y )US 0 0 0
E( CAo
Y )US  2:34  2:13  1:92
E( NFIA
Y )US 0:61  0:13  0:79
E(
NetEquity
Y )US 50:38 35:26 19:95
E( NetBond
Y )US  76:16  75:03  72:78
E( NetAsset
Y )US  25:79  39:77  52:83
Notes: The simulation results are generated by an economy with 18;000 agents for each type and 10;000 periods.
42A Computation of the US External Position
Our data series are from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The private consumption
and government consumption series are from the BEA's National Income Product Account. The
balance of payments statistics are from the BEA's US International Transactions. The external
position series are from the BEA's International Investment Position of the United States at Year
End.
As in Gourinchas and Rey (2007a), we exclude nancial derivatives from both the asset position
and the liability position, because the data of nancial derivatives before 2004 are not available. The
dierence in our statistics and their statistics is in the treatment of US government holdings of gold,
special drawing rights and reserve position in the International Monetary Fund. Gourinchas and
Rey (2007a) include them in the US external asset position, but we exclude them for the following
reasons. One, changes in the value of US government holdings of gold, special drawing rights
and reserve position in the International Monetary Fund are not driven by portfolio adjustments
and merely reect the valuation of assets. Two, holdings of long-term assets by US government
are not driven by a portfolio choice, since these assets include paid-in capital subscriptions to
international nancial institutions and resources provided to foreigners under foreign assistance
programs requiring repayment over several years. To be precise, we calculate the US external asset
position and the US external liability position as follows.
1. US external asset position (At) = Foreign direct investment at current cost + Foreign cor-
porate stock securities + US ocial holding of foreign currencies + US private holding of
foreign bond securities + US claims on unaliated foreigners reported by US nonbanking
concerns + US claims reported by US banks and securities brokers, not included elsewhere.
2. US external liability position (Lt)= Foreign-owned direct investment at current cost +
Foreign-owned US corporate stock securities + Foreign holding of US Treasury securities
+ Foreign holding of US securities other than Treasury securities + Foreign holding of US
corporate and other bond securities + Foreign holding of US currency + US ocial liabilities
reported by US banks and securities brokers, not included elsewhere + Other foreign ocial
assets + US liabilities to unaliated foreigners reported by US nonbanking concerns + US
liabilities reported by US banks and securities brokers, not included elsewhere
43B Details on Household Problem
B.1 Measurability Restrictions
To capture these portfolio restrictions implied by the dierent trading technologies, we use mea-
sureability constraints (see Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011) for a detailed discussion) on net wealth.
These restrictions allow us to solve for equilibrium allocations and prices without searching for all
the equilibrium prices that clear each security market.
Mertonian Traders Since Mertonian traders are able to trade state-contingent claims, their
asset holding can depend on the aggregate state but not the idiosyncratic state. The net wealth




















for all t and i;t; ~ i;t 2 N:
Non-Mertonian Traders Equity target traders who hold a xed fraction $ in levered equity















t;t 1(zt) denotes for the equity return between period t and t   1 given the realization of












for all t, zt; ~ zt 2 Z, and t; ~ t 2 N. If $ = 1=(1 +  ); then this trader holds the market in each
period and earns the return on a claim to aggregate diversiable output. There is a special type
of passive traders who do not participate in the equity market and only holds risk free assets. We
call them non-participants, who can be thought of as those passive traders with zero equity target
share, $ = 0.
44B.2 Saddle Point Problem
It is convenient to write household problems in the fashion of zero trading. From the aggregate
state-contingent prices on consumption, we can back out the time zero price of a consumption







Mertonian traders Let's start with the Mertonian trader's problem in country i: Let  denote
the multiplier on the present-value budget constraint, let (zt;i;t) denote the multiplier on the
measurability constraint in node (zt;i;t), and, nally, let '(zt;i;t) denote the multiplier on the






























































































where e P(zt;i;t) = (zt;i;t)P(zt).










t) for all z
t;
i;t;













with initial 0 = . (See Marcet and Marimon (1999) for this recursive method).








i;t) = 0 for all z
t;
i;t:
It is easy to show that this is a standard convex programming problem, so the rst order conditions
are necessary and sucient.
Non-Mertonian Traders The saddle point problem of an equity target trader with target share


































































































































t) for all z
t;
i;t;
where (zt;i;t) is dened as in Equation (17). The rst order condition respect to consumption is
independent of trading technologies. The rst order condition with respect to total asset holding














it) = 0 for all z
t;
i;t (18)
46We refer to this as the martingale condition. This condition is specic to the trading technology.
B.3 Stochastic Discount Factor


































With CRRA preferences, this implies that the household consumption share relative to aggregate


























Hence, the  1=th moment of the multipliers summarizes risk sharing within this economy. The















47C Law of Motion in NFAt











































































































































































































D First Two Moments on Output Growth Rate
Our world consists of 48 countries. The data range is from 1980 to 2009 at annual frequency.
The household consumption expenditure series (Cit) and the GDP deator series (Pit) are from
the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics. The population series (Nit)
48is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The GDP share data are from the US
Department of Agriculture's ERS Database. We calculate the world average of rst two moments
of growth rate of per capita real consumption in three steps.
First, we obtain the growth rate of real consumption per capita for each country: git =
cit=ci;t 1  1; where cit = Cit=(PitNit). Next, we calculate the standard deviation of git and denote
it as i(git). Finally, we calculate the weighted average of the country-specic standard deviation
of growth of real consumption per capita using the GDP share as the weight. Let (zt) denote the








t=1980 wi;t=30 and wi;t = GDPi;t=
P48
i=1 GDP i;t. Based on our data set, the average
growth rate of consumption is 2:54% and its standard deviation is 3:02%.
49